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Abstract 
Language planning and control have played a prominent role in attempts of nation building 
in contemporary Romania, a nation-state formed in the early 20th century by binding together 
provinces that were previously part of multi-national empires. As a long-lasting process, 
language control stretches throughout many historical periods. In communist and post-
communist era, it has largely interfered with the political logic of both socialist 
internationalism and post-socialist democratic citizenry. More recently, under the impact of 
the European Union’s expansion to the East and Romania’s integration to it, language 
control has switched from severe limiting minority languages to a fair acceptance of 
reasonable compromises with the official dominance of Romanian as national official 
language. Although Romania acknowledges several minority languages, the article focuses 
on the usage of Hungarian language, the most important minority language in Romania. The 
aim of the article is double. On one hand, it analyses political negotiations over the status 
and corpus of the Hungarian language, by assessing the importance of language policies in 
the broader context of the processes of historical reconciliation and neighbourhood policies 
between Romania and Hungary. On the other hand, it deals with the political cooperation 
between Romanian and Hungarian political parties in Romania during the democratic post-
communist transition. 
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Since modern Romania was built-up in the early twentieth century by 
bringing together provinces that previously were parts of multi-national 
empires, language planning and control is one of the most prominent aspect of 
nation-building in modern and contemporary Romania. As it is a long-lasting 
process, language control is by no means attached to pre-communist settings. In 
communist and post-communist eras, it largely interferes with the political logic 
of socialist internationalism and post-socialist democratic citizenry. Only 
recently, under the impact of European expansion and Romania’s effective 
integration into the EU and NATO, language control has switched from a severe 
limitation of minority languages to a fair acceptance of reasonable compromises 
with the principle of Romanian language dominance in the administration and 
education systems. In fact, despite the legal status of Romanian as the exclusive 
official language, since the beginning of the post-communist transition, 
minority languages have been accepted in various domains, especially in 
geographic areas where ethnic minority populations trespass a given threshold. 
Minority languages can be used today at every educational level, including 
university level, in public administration, mass-media and various cultural 
domains (publications, museums and theaters). The expanded right to use 
minority languages is a key issue in defining the current status of ethnic 
minorities in Romania. 
The article focuses on the evolution of language planning, by 
emphasizing the use of the Hungarian language as the most largely used 
minority language. The article attempts to make an overview of language 
planning and control, beginning with the concern for protecting the national 
language from external cultural pressure when Romanian provinces were parts 
of the Habsburg, Ottoman and Tsarist empires before 1918, and moving 
towards a more active planning with the tools offered by the brand-new national 
state following World War One. After a brief glance at the language disputes 
during the inter-war period, the article examines the role played by language 
policies in the process of consolidation of national-socialism, despite the 
officially claimed internationalist features of communism. The long-lasting 
effects of these policies and the democratic constraints after the regime change 
in 1989 form the main part of the article and include a thorough analysis of the 
political negotiations and structural changes that turned minority languages, 
especially the Hungarian language, into reasonable compromises to the official 
use of Romanian language as the only accepted language. Finally, the paper 
intends to assess the importance of language policies towards the Hungarian 
ethnic minority for the broader process of historical reconciliation and 
neighborhood policies between Romania and Hungary, as well as for internal 
political cooperation between Romanian and Hungarian political parties during 
the democratic post-communist transition. 
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Historical Background 
 
Romania celebrates in 2018 its centennial anniversary as national state. 
In its current composition, Romania was made up in 1918 by binding together 
several provinces that previously were part of multi-national empires (Russian, 
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires) and by attaching them to the Kingdom 
of Romania. The Kingdom of Romania itself was made up in two steps: by the 
alliance of the historical provinces of Wallachia and Moldova in 1859, which 
formed a new state called Romania, and by their subsequent independence from 
the Ottoman empire following the national liberation war of 1877.1 To this 
recent Romanian national state new provinces were attached in 1918, namely 
Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvania. Although they were part of multi-
national empires, ethnic Romanians, who constituted a majority in each of these 
provinces, inhabited them in large shares. 
Their integration into Romania fulfilled the dream of Romanian 
national elites that one day the provinces would be part of a larger, national 
state. This is especially true for Transylvania, where Romanian national elites 
were struggling against the elites of dominant Hungarian and Austrian nations.2 
In the period of modernization of the Habsburg empire by Emperor Joseph the 
Second, and especially following the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 
(known as Ausgleich), ethnic Romanians were confronted with the nationalizing 
tendencies of the new Hungarian government and were struggling to achieve 
equal rights in the political framework of the Habsburg monarchy. At the same 
time, the integration of new provinces brought in large ethnic minorities, lead 
by more active, educated and urbanized elites.3 Those ethnic minorities soon 
become the target of nationalization policies put in place by Romanian elites, 
who were aiming at building and consolidating a Romanian national state by the 
homogenization of national territory and culture. The tension between minority 
rights and the Romanian national integration is the most prominent issue during 
the whole 20th century, but one can still notice it today.4 
The severe nationalization policies put in place by the young Romanian 
national state after 1918 were the product of a deep distrust between ethnic 
Romanians and ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania. On the one hand, Romanian 
                                                 
1
  Keith Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK, 1994. 
2
  Idem, The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1780-1849, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge MA, 1969. 
3
  Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation-Building and 
Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930, Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY, 1995. 
4
  Dragoș Dragoman, ‘Ethnic groups in symbolic conflict. The ‘ethnicisation’ of public 
space in Romania’, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. XI, no. 1, 
2011, pp. 105-121. 
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elites constantly feared a brutal secession of ethnic Hungarians, with the support 
of the neighboring Hungarian state. On the other hand, ethnic Hungarians feared 
a slow but painful assimilation in the framework of the Romanian national state. 
If one looks back into recent history, none of those fears was purely imaginary. 
With the consolidation of the Romanian national state, and despite many efforts 
made by the Hungarian elites, the Hungarian population stated to decline in 
share, a process that continued for the rest of the 20th century.5 At the same 
time, ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania continued to be considered by the 
Hungarian state as part of the Hungarian nation, despite the fact that they were 
living in Romania and were Romanian citizens. When the European and 
regional context turned favorable, the Hungarian state claimed its right to decide 
the fate of ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania and attached half of the province 
in 1940, by the second Vienna Award that followed the secret protocol of the 
Non-Aggression Pact between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. This 
geopolitical move was made despite the fact that both Hungary and Romania 
were allies of Nazi Germany.6 This territorial loss was short-lived, since the lost 
half of the province was recovered by Romania in 1944 and the border from the 
1920 Peace Treaty with Hungary was reconfirmed by the Peace Treaties from 
1947. Its impact on Romanian elites’ sensibility was however very important. 
The issue of a territorial autonomy of ethnic Hungarians living in Transylvania 
and the overall regionalization process in Romania is still marked by that event 
that occurred in 1940.7 
 
 
Language Disputes During the Inter-War Period 
 
With Transylvania and the other provinces under the sovereignty of the 
Romanian national state, the nationalization policies aimed at unifying the 
national territory and the national culture. This is to be seen not only in the 
symbolic domination of the public space, but also in the emphasis put on 
Romanian as national language and the restrictive use of ethnic minorities 
languages. The new Romanian administration faces a widespread use of other 
languages than Romanian, especially in major urban settlements from all of the 
new provinces, in Transylvania, Bukovina and Banat. The struggle to dominate 
                                                 
5
  Elemér Illyés, National Minorities in Romania. Change in Transylvania, East European 
Monographs, Boulder CO, 1982. 
6
  Denis Deletant, Hitler’s Forgotten Ally. Ion Antonescu and His Regime, Romania 1940-
1944, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2006. 
7
  Dragoș Dragoman, Bogdan Gheorghiță, “Regional design, local autonomy and ethnic 
struggle: Romania’s syncopated regionalization”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 68, no. 2, 
2016, pp. 270-290. 
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the public space is first of all symbolic. Romanian street names and statues of 
national heroes begun to fill the disposable urban space, helping to strengthen 
the feeling of belonging to the urban space, thus becoming a key element for 
identity politics. They all stand for identity markers and evoke specific 
historical eras by expressing the ideological dominance of political rulership. 
They commemorate past events and heroes, and therefore strengthen collective 
identity by constructing and reconstructing (and sometimes re-writing) history 
and tradition.8 
But the linguistic battle was more than replacing street names in 
Transylvanian towns. Confronting more educated and urbanized elites of ethnic 
minorities also meant promoting equality, if not imposing supremacy in higher 
education. As mentioned above, Romanian elites struggled for decades to obtain 
equal cultural and political rights for ethnic Romanians as citizens of the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.9 They had to many times pressure the Emperor 
himself in order to get a positive answer that was at least partial to their claims 
sent to the Hungarian parliament and government in Budapest. Their struggle 
was aimed at providing basic conditions for education and culture in Romanian 
language, namely to get the permission to edit publications and to set up 
libraries and ethnographic museums. The existence in Cluj, the largest town in 
Transylvania and its capital-city throughout the 19th century, of a public 
university teaching in Hungarian was a very serious issue for Romanian elites. 
The university in Cluj, called the „Franz Joseph” University, was 
founded in 1872 by the Hungarian government following the Austro-Hungarian 
Compromise, as a mean to support higher education, encourage scientific 
research and promote Hungarian national values. Its aim was to support the 
growth of an intellectual elite, who could successfully rival those in Budapest 
and Vienna. In this respect, only years after its foundation, the scholarly and 
scientific achievements of its teachers and students were quite remarkable in the 
region.10 That is why Romanian elites decided that keeping a university 
teaching in Hungarian in the heart of Transylvania would be a serious threat to 
Romanian national unity and would endanger its aim to unify the national 
territory and culture. Therefore, the Hungarian university, including its teachers 
and students, were transferred in 1919 to Szeged, across the newly established 
Romanian-Hungarian border, while all the patrimonial goods of the former 
university were put at the disposal of a new university teaching in Romanian. 
                                                 
8
  Eric J. Hobsbawm, Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge UK, 1983; John R. Gillis (ed.), Commemorations: The 
Politics of National Identity, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1996. 
9
  Keith Hitchins, A Nation Affirmed: The Romanian National Movement in Transylvania, 
Encyclopaedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 1999. 
10
  Victor Karady, Lucian Nastasă, The University of Kolozsvár/Cluj and the Students of the 
Medical Faculty (1872-1918), Central European University Press, Budapest, 2004. 
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This was symbolically renamed „King Ferdinand I”, in order to emphasize 
Transylvania’s integration into the Kingdom of Romania, ruled then by king 
Ferdinand I. This situation lasted until 1940, when the city of Cluj alongside 
half of the province of Transylvania was ceased to the Hungarian state and the 
university was transferred to Sibiu, in the part of Transylvania still attached to 
the Romanian national state. At the end of World War Two, the Soviet style 
Romanian government reshaped regional administration and higher education 
by redefining regional design and by bringing back to Cluj the Romanian 
university. As emphasized below, the issue of the Hungarian speaking 
university in Cluj remained until today one of the most sensitive language 
issues, influencing political negotiations between Romanian and Hungarian 
political parties and between the Romanian and the Hungarian government. 
 
 
Ethnic Issues During the Communist Era 
 
 The first years of Romanian communism are in line with international 
communism, which is an ideological tendency to emphasize the unity of all 
workers and peasants, regardless of their native language or religion. In order to 
promote the internationalism of the working class, the new Romanian 
communist administration decided to get rid of previous national disputes and 
cleavages. Territory and culture were then to be seen as expression of the 
neutral condition for the development of a solid working class that would 
rapidly transcend former ethnic lines. That is why the national territory was 
reorganized in 1952 and the Hungarian minority in Transylvania benefitted 
from larger administrative autonomy in the framework of a Hungarian 
Autonomous Region.11 Moreover, a new public university teaching in 
Hungarian was founded in Cluj, bearing the name of the illustrious Hungarian 
mathematician János Bolyai. This university was to accompany the other university 
in town, that teaching in Romanian, back in town in 1945. The Romanian 
university was renamed after the famous Romanian biologist Victor Babeș. 
 The 1956 Hungarian anti-communist uprising was to change the mind 
of Romanian communist elites. Fearing the spreading of the contention, the 
Romanian authorities limited the autonomy rights of the Hungarians in 
Transylvania, beginning with the separate functioning of the public university 
teaching in Hungarian. Since the city of Cluj was hosting two universities, they 
were forced to merge in 1959 under the name of „Babeș-Bolyai” University. As 
emphasized below, the coexistence of different chairs teaching in Romanian and 
Hungarian is the way the multi-lingual university has been working ever since. 
Despite the claims made by Hungarian teachers and students for separate 
                                                 
11
  Dragoș Dragoman, Bogdan Gheorghiță, ‘Regional design, local autonomy and ethnic 
struggle…cit.” 
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faculties, the only form of autonomous functioning is still that of separate chairs 
inside mixed faculties, meaning that Hungarian speaking teachers and students 
work alongside Romanian teachers and students in the framework of faculties, 
sharing decisions and responsibilities. 
 Despite its initial internationalist scope, the communist regime slowly 
began to transform and finally turned into fierce Romanian nationalism under 
the reign of Nicolae Ceaușescu. In his effort to consolidate his own power, he 
initially made a relentless effort to reconcile universalist Lenininsm and 
Romanian nationalism,12 but finally merely focused on his goal of transforming 
socialism into a national communism.13 Reshaping the regional design and 
homogenizing once again the national territory by putting an end to the 
Hungarian regional autonomy in 1968 was followed by restricting the use of 
Hungarian language and altering the ethnic composition of many cities and 
counties in Transylvania. Due to forced urbanization of many rural areas and 
controlled internal migration of the working force distributed across the national 
territory by arbitrary administrative decisions, the Hungarian minority felt very 
much under pressure, especially during the last decade of communist rule. The 
situation of ethnic Hungarians living in Transylvania become a domestic 
political issue in Hungarian politics, being used by the anti-communist 
opposition during the massive street rallies against the communist ruling elites 
in the late 1980s.14 The very end of the communist regime in Romania is related 
to this kind of ethnic tension. The trigger of the mass protest against the regime 
of Nicolae Ceaușescu was the communist secret police action against a 
Hungarian protestant priest in Timișoara, whom it tried to evict from his parish. 
The overt public support for the priest turned into a massive street rally only 
hours after the failed eviction. Due to overly brutal repression measures on the 
part of the army and secret police, the protest turned into a nation-wide anti-
communist revolution that overthrew the communist regime. 
 
 
Language Disputes During the First years of the 
Post-Communist Transition 
 
 For many observers in the first years after the breakdown of the 
communist regime, post-communism in Central and Eastern Europe should 
have been much similar to the experiences of earlier transitions, those from 
                                                 
12
  Cheng CHEN, ‘The Roots of Illiberal Nationalism in Romania: A Historical 
Institutionalist Analysis of the Leninist Legacy’, East European Politics and Societies, 
vol. 17, no. 2, 2003, pp. 166-201. 
13
  Katherine Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in 
Ceaușescu’s Romania, California University Press, Berkeley CA, 1995. 
14
  Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern 
Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford UK, 2003. 
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Southern Europe and South America.15 They expected that transition encompass 
two major transformations, namely political institutions, from autocracy to 
democratic and civic rights, and economy, from the state-led economy to a free 
market economy. Democratization and marketization would thus have been the 
two goals of any post-communist government.16 The violent breakdown of the 
multi-national Soviet and Yugoslav republics and the role played by 
nationalism in shaping attitudes towards the new political and social context 
that followed the collapse of communism clearly signaled that transition would 
be multi-fold.17 It would encompass more than two dimensions, since 
nationhood and statehood had to be added to the previous institutional and 
economic dimensions, leaving an open question whether nation-building 
policies would be congruent with state policies aimed at crafting democracy.18 
The transition is more complicated in Central and Eastern Europe because the 
newly democratic regimes inherited from the previous communist regimes very 
serious problems ranging from ethnic minorities and secessionist threats to 
violent border disputes.19 
 The regional ethnic tension is also to be seen in Romania in the early 
1990s. Only months before the beginning of the violent process that would lead 
to the breakdown of the former Yugoslav state, Romania witnessed a very 
serious episode of overt ethnic clashes between ethnic Romanians and ethnic 
Hungarians in Târgu-Mureș, an ethnically mixed town in Transylvania. In 
March 1990, Romania was on the brink of ethnic conflict. Despite emotions, 
raised by the cruelty and the bloodshed, running high on both sides, the political 
elites of the two ethnic segments managed to set up a peaceful agreement on 
how to shape the general conditions for minority protection and democratic 
consolidation. The process, which ended in a particular type of ethnic status-
quo, was not free of serious threats and tensions. However, as it is worth to 
notice, this type of agreement differs from both ethnic violence in former 
Yugoslavia and ethnic democracy in the Baltic states. Ethnic democracy means 
the contradictory combination of democracy for all with ethnic ascendancy, a 
                                                 
15
  David Collier (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton NJ, 1979; Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Lynne 
Rienner, Boulder CO, 2000; Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions 
from Authoritarian Rule, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore MD, 1986. 
16
  Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1991. 
17
  Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito 
to the War for Kosovo, Westview Press, Boulder CO, 1999. 
18
  Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University 
Press, Baltimore MD, 1996. 
19
  Taras Kuzio, ‘Transition in post-communist states: triple or quadruple’, Politics, vol. 21, 
no. 3, 2001, pp. 168-177. 
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special kind of democracy lacking both civic equality and civic nation as pillars 
of liberal or consociational types of democracy.20 In this latter case, democracy 
was built in the first years of post-communism by restricting the use of minority 
rights in order to promote an expansion, even a reparation, of majority rights. It 
was considered that the new Latvian or Estonian-speaking majorities had to 
benefit from extended rights to consolidate the status of their national languages 
in front of the former ruling Russian minority. At least for a period of time, the 
severe inequality in civil rights would benefit the restoration of the previously 
neglected, if not suppressed, minor Latvian or Estonian languages.21 
 The first years of post-communism were decisive in shaping the 
relationship between the state, the Romanian majority group and minority 
groups, especially with the Hungarians living in Transylvania, which represent 
the largest minority group relying on a very well organized ethnic political 
party. In fact, the early existence of a legitimate, although unexperienced and 
still inchoate ethnic Hungarian party (the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in 
Romania, Uniunea Democrată a Maghiarilor din România – UDMR), largely 
facilitated in March 1990 the task of state authorities and Romanian party elites 
to negotiate a peaceful ethnic arrangement for appeasing the ethnic tension and 
setting up a future solid and permanent agreement on minority issues. Of 
course, the negotiations are not free of external influence, ethnic Hungarian and 
Romanian elites looking at favorable negotiated solutions that were already in 
place, but having also in mind the drastic solutions put forward by ethnic 
democracy in the Baltic states and the terrible bloodshed in former Yugoslavia. 
 The first years were essential in the settlement of a negotiated solution 
for minority rights from another perspective as well. Unlike other former 
communist states such as Hungary and Poland, which merely amended their 
former communist constitutions, Romania initiated a more complex procedure 
of writing a brand-new democratic constitution that was to replace the obsolete 
communist one. Therefore, negotiations between ethnic elites regarded both the 
constitutional framework and specific laws on public administration and 
education in minority languages. Despite the openness for negotiating minority 
rights, the constitution adopted in 1991 generally reflects the willingness of the 
majority group to set up a dominant position. Romania was declared a national 
state whose sovereignty was based on the unity of the Romanian people, 
                                                 
20
  Sammy Smooha, ‘Types of democracy and modes of conflict management in ethnically 
divided societies’, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 8, no. 4, 2002, pp. 423-431; Yoav Peled, 
The Challenge of Ethnic Democracy: The State and Minority Groups in Israel, Poland 
and Northern Ireland, Routledge, London, 2014. 
21
  Priit Järve, “Language battles in the Baltic States: 1998 to 2002”, in Farimah Daftary, 
François Grin (eds.), Ethnicity and Language Politics in Transition Countries, Open 
Society Institute, Budapest, 2003, pp. 73-106; Sammy Smooha, Priit Järve (eds.), The 
Fate of Ethnic Democracy in Post-Communist Europe, Open Society Institute, Budapest, 
2005. 
130  DRAGOȘ DRAGOMAN 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVIII  no. 1  2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
making thus a statement of dominance of the Romanian nation and language, 
which was adopted as the sole official language. Minority rights only come in 
second place, but they are clearly expressed as guaranteed by the constitution in 
the field of education, culture and religion, with respect to the principle of 
equality and non-discrimination in relation to other citizens in Romania. 
The protest response of the Hungarian political elites in parliament 
reflects the disillusion with the inertia associated with changing attitudes 
towards ethnic minorities. As one could have expected, the end of communism 
was about to bring a quick and undisputed improvement in minority status, 
making a break with the previous era, when, in the final stages of communism, 
ethnic minorities felt deep pressure from state authorities. At the same time, 
claims for cultural and administrative autonomy raised fears among ethnic 
Romanians, who still feared that larger autonomy for ethnic Hungarians could 
end in secession and open conflict, as it was then the case in former Yugoslavia. 
Those fears were largely exploited by parties in government, which were 
looking for alternative legitimacy issues in order to consolidate in power.22 With 
the 1991 Constitution in place, the only room opened for improving the minority 
rights was negotiating specific laws on education and public administration, 
which were aimed at defining the cultural autonomy of ethnic minorities. 
The Local Administration Act of 1991 reconfirmed the supremacy of 
the Romanian language, even in counties and localities where ethic minorities 
constituted the majority of inhabitants. The law was so restrictive that it forced 
elected officials to use Romanian, the national language, in open debates in 
local councils, for example, even where there was no ethnic Romanian elected 
official. It went the same with official communications between local 
authorities and citizens, where minorities could use their native language in 
formal, written requests only if they were accompanied by a Romanian 
translation. In practice, however, Hungarian was used much more than the law 
regulated, since public administration of those localities where minorities were 
of significant importance was considered an extension of the public space where 
minorities were unrestrictedly speaking their own native language. The legal 
provisions were thus symbolic, aimed at clearly assessing the primacy of the 
Romanian language. The same goes with education. Following a tense debate in 
parliament, the 1995 Act of Education was based on a rather narrow 
interpretation of the Constitution. Although the law acknowledged the use of 
Hungarian and other minority languages in primary, secondary and university 
education, it stated the obligation for disciplines as history or geography to be 
taught only in Romanian. This was a clear symbolic constraint, since it was well 
                                                 
22
  Tom Gallagher, ‘Nationalism and political culture in the 1990s’, in Duncan Light, David 
Phinnemore (eds.), Post-Communist Romania: Coming to Terms with Transition, 
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2001, pp. 104-124. 
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known that ethnic minorities use peculiar, different geographic denominations 
and that they use different perspectives when dealing with various historical 
events. This was of paramount importance for Romanian nationalists, since 
sharing the same geographic space with minorities (in Transylvania, for 
example) also means opposing conflicting historical narratives. It is worth 
mentioning that Romanian National Day, December the 1st, commemorates the 
1918 attachment of Transylvania to modern Romania. At the same time, this 
attachment would have been impossible without a proper previous secession of 
the province from Austria-Hungary. Thus celebrating the National Day also 
means remembering to the Hungarians in Transylvania the loss of the province 
by the Hungarian state. 
This is not the only opposing historical narrative, a dispute between 
ethnic communities about how to interpret historical events. The 1940 
attachment of Northern Transylvania to fascist Hungary by the second Vienna 
Award following the secret pact between the two totalitarian regimes, Nazi 
Germany and the Soviet Union, is seen differently by the two ethnic groups. But 
the best example of different approaches when it comes to symbolically 
weighing the importance of a past event is to be recorded few years later, when 
the relationship between ethnic political elites has already entered its 
cooperation phase, as we underline below. The disputed issue was the 
willingness of the Hungarian community in Arad, an ethnically mixed town 
near the border with Hungary, to restore and put in place an ancient 
monumental statuary commemorating 13 Hungarian generals, national heroes, 
who have been executed for mutiny by the Austrian imperial army during the 
1848-49 Hungarian uprising against the ruling Habsburg monarchy.23 The 
‘Liberty Statue’, as it is known in the city, was inaugurated in 1880 by the 
Hungarian government, but as soon as Transylvania was attached to the 
Kingdom of Romania, the statue was dismantled and deposited in the town 
fortress. When the Hungarian local community in Arad, backed by UDMR, 
demanded the restoration of the statue, the Romanian authorities refused to do 
so, by invoking the same argument that led to the dismantling of the statue, 
back in 1924. The 13 generals could have been Hungarian national heroes, yet 
they were guilty of murdering ethnic Romanians, who largely remained 
favorable to the Habsburg emperor in the 1848-1849 period. The compromise 
reached by ethnic elites in Arad was, in the end, that the ‘Liberty Statue’ be 
accompanied by Romanian national symbols, an arch of triumph symbolizing 
Romanian revolutionaries. The presence of the Romanian arch of triumph thus 
diluted the ethnic presence of the ‘Liberty Statue’, balancing the symbolic 
Hungarian dominance. The case presented here is important for the way the two 
                                                 
23
  István Deák, The Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848-1849, 
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ethnic communities imagine the public space and for the mechanisms of 
negotiation put in place in order to accommodate conflicting demands. Yet 
another factor is to be taken into account when trying to understand complex 
ethnic relations and language issues in Romania, namely external factors. 
 
 
Language Issues and Minority Rights: External Pressure and 
Domestic Cooperation 
 
When paying attention to the initial, restrictive minority language status 
in Romania,24 one could hardly understand the subsequent shifts and significant 
improvements in minority rights without reference to the external factors. For 
Romania, that external factors were, for a long period of time, the political 
requirements for EU and NATO membership. But even that membership was 
unconceivable without full membership into the wider, continental political 
arrangement which is the Council of Europe. Being part of the Council was the 
first step in claiming membership in the EU and NATO and fulfilling the 
requirements of the Council of Europe was a test of good will and commitment 
for future adaptation of national regulations to European rules. When one looks 
back, it seems that European conditionality was much more effective for 
minority issues than for other policy areas, as for example, sub-national 
governance and regional design.25 In the area of minority rights, the EU 
conditionality worked in combination with the consolidation of democracy,26 
aiming at fulfilling general requirements before starting technical negotiations 
with candidate countries for more specific matters.27 Those accession criteria 
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have already been set up by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 and 
represent a series of political, economic and administrative conditions for 
candidate countries. Among political criteria, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities have become one of the most relevant issues when deciding 
to start negotiations with former communist states.28 Combined with the normative 
and political pressures of the Council of Europe and of the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union accession criteria largely 
helped unstable democracies in Central and Eastern Europe to consolidate and 
to improve minority rights. From this perspective, the situation in Romania 
improved greatly during the phase of preparation for and negotiation of EU 
accession, turning Romania from a laggard to a leader in the region.29 
 Such a shift in minority rights conceptualization in Romania is 
unconceivable without the changing political attitudes towards UDMR in 
Romania. Forming an opposition coalition with right-wing parties against the 
Social Democrat Party (Partidul Democrației Sociale – PDSR, later on Partidul 
Social-Democrat – PSD) between 1990 and 1996,30 UDMR imposed as a key 
party in forming subsequent coalitions. Being part of governing coalitions gave 
UDMR a coalition potential that turned partially into blackmail potential during 
the 1996-2000 period. It was the period when Romania entered a deep 
democratization process, accompanied by severe economic changes towards 
large scale privatization and free-market economy. Within the larger process of 
consolidating democracy, expanding minority rights was the effect of both 
internal and external pressure, with Romania very eager, but finally failing to 
join NATO in 1999. In fact, the Romanian government expected that Romania 
would receive a formal invitation to join NATO at the organization’s summit in 
Madrid. This was not the case, which put new pressure on the next government 
(2000-2004) formed by PSD with the essential support of UDMR in parliament. 
The participation of the Hungarian party in those coalitions between 
1996 and 2000 and the key party position in parliament between 2000 and 2004 
fostered favorable internal conditions for expanding linguistic rights for 
minorities.31 In a contrasting shift from the previous period, minorities have 
been endowed with significant linguistic rights. Not only were the very 
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restrictive legal provisions in teaching history and geography lifted, but the use 
of minority languages was accepted at all educational levels, from primary 
school to the university level, with the obligation of teaching and learning 
Romanian as official language. Moreover, the use of minority languages was 
extended in justice matters and, very important, in public administration. Public 
debates in minority languages in the local councils were accepted with proper 
translation in Romanian and with the final decision and disposition to be written in 
Romanian. According the the new Public Administration Law (215 from 2001), in 
all localities where minorities trespass a 20% threshold, public institutions and 
local authorities use minority languages when in relation with citizens from 
minority groups. Finally, public inscriptions are equally provided in the minority 
language, wherever the minority group trespasses 20% of the population. 
European conditionality not only worked by imposing standards for 
minority rights, but it also helped to balance and stabilize political divergences 
and conflicts that could have occurred between ethnic groups or between states. 
This proved of great importance when national governments had difficulties in 
reaching compromises. The Council of Europe, and especially its Commission 
for Democracy, also known as the Venice Commission, helped the Romanian 
and the Hungarian governments to reach an agreement on the extra-territoriality 
of the support granted by the kin state to ethnic members living in neighboring 
states. By this, the Venice Commission tackled the discrimination effects of 
national laws, when they are designed to protect and support ethnic diaspora. It 
was the case in 2001, when the Hungarian government issued a special Law on 
the Status of Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries, also known as the 
‘Status Law’. The law was designed to support ethnic Hungarians living in the 
nearby diaspora, by granting them special rights like education, travel, working 
permits, social assistance and health benefits. Ethnic Hungarians were entitled 
to benefit from those facilities in Hungary, as well as at home, in the 
neighboring countries. In fact, the law not only aimed to facilitate their stay on 
the Hungarian territory (museum and library tickets, bus tickets, other discounts 
and facilities), but to support ethnic Hungarians living in the near diaspora to 
use their native language (monthly allocations for children attending Hungarian 
language schools and universities). Equally symbolic and practical, the ‘Status 
Law’ was expanding the Hungarian nation,32 and even turning Hungarian 
diaspora into a political actor in Hungarian politics.33 
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The ‘Status Law’ excited much criticism from all the neighboring 
states, and the Hungarian government decided to adopt the recommendations of 
the Venice Commission by amending the law. During negotiations with 
governments from the neighboring states, especially with the Romanian 
government run by PSD, the Hungarian government limited the application of 
the law on the Hungarian soil alone and eliminated the discriminatory 
provisions in granting working permits and other kinds of support. Moreover, 
the certificates confirming the status of beneficiaries as ethnic Hungarians were 
to be issued and distributed by the Hungarian state itself, with no support from 
the Hungarian associations in neighboring countries. The compromise accepted 
by the Hungarian government, under the supervision of the Council of Europe’s 
Commission for Democracy, put an end to the vivid disputes triggered by the 
‘Status Law’ and largely helped restoring the governmental cooperation 
between Hungary and Romania.34 This positive cooperation led to what was 
unconceivable only few years before, namely to common special sessions of the 
Romanian and Hungarian governments, gathered in Hungary or in Romania to 
discuss common economic and political projects. The cooperation not only 
helped to ease ethnic tension in Transylvania, but to facilitate cooperation and 
mutual support for NATO and EU membership. One of the most vivid fears of 
Romanians, for Hungary to be integrated into regional organizations while 
Romania was kept apart, got lifted with Romania’s accession to NATO in 2004 
and to the EU in 2007, only few years after Hungary’s accession in 1999 and 
2004, respectively. 
 
 
Recurrent Ethnic Tensions and Unsolved Language Problems 
 
Despite important progress at governmental levels that fostered the 
necessary ethnic peaceful climate and boosted the speed of accession into major 
regional organizations for both Hungary and Romania, several language issues 
are still in dispute. As it was before, the issues are both practical and 
symbolical, as they can be used in defining the boundaries of the nation,35 or in 
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shaping internal party competition.36 With the expansion of minority rights, the 
remaining language issues concern not the full use of Hungarian in public 
education, but the autonomous organization of institutions providing education 
in Hungarian. After Romania ratified the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages in 2008 and, in parallel, the law for patrimonial restitution 
was strictly enforced in Romania, the Hungarian community in Transylvania 
recovered many of the desired proper conditions for the preservation of its 
native language and of its cultural identity. Through the restitution act, both 
Catholic and Protestant churches of Hungarians recovered large parts of the 
patrimony they have been dispossessed of by the former Communist regime 
back in 1948. Many of the restituted buildings have been donated by the 
Hungarian churches to Hungarian language schools. In compensation, new 
schools were required for ethnic Romanian pupils, sometimes in peripheral or 
semi-peripheral urban areas. 
The ethnic segregation of formerly mixed Romanian and Hungarian 
schools, which functioned during communism is seen differently by the two 
ethnic communities. For ethnic Hungarians, the separation of schools is a 
necessary condition for an autonomous and harmonious development of 
Hungarian language education institutions. For ethnic Romanians, moving 
ethnic Romanian pupils from the center of many cities in the region and 
relocating them at their periphery, is a stark symbolic defeat, since Romanian 
elites fought for many decades, during the reign of the Habsburg monarchy, for 
equality with other ethnicities. The same argument is to be recorded in the 
dispute regarding the dismantlement of the multilingual university in Cluj. 
Although the current legal provisions allow for full education in Hungarian, no 
Romanian government took yet the much controversial decision of separating 
Hungarian and Romanian faculties along the distinction provided by the language 
of instruction, as many ethnic Hungarian students, teachers and politicians have 
requested. Despite this seemingly being a technical issue, segregating faculties 
alongside linguistic lines also bears an important symbolic weight. 
It is worth underlining again that from its very beginning in 1872, the 
‘Franz Joseph’ university in Cluj was created with the purpose to fully 
emancipate Hungarian culture and science, in order to equal the dominant 
German culture in the empire.37 The university came as a natural outcome of the 
Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 and the political unification of Hungary 
and Transylvania following centuries of separate development due to 
unfavorable external conditionality. It bared the name of the Emperor himself as 
a clear sign of praise for his liberal views towards the consolidation of higher 
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education and towards the Hungarians’ right for separate and representative 
institutions within the framework of the Dual Monarchy. For several decades, 
the university in Cluj was the focus point of all the intellectual energy and 
passion of scholars in Transylvania, and thus become a solid and highly praised 
institution. It is easy to understand, therefore, why the Romanian authorities 
took the decision to put an end to the Hungarian university in Transylvania after 
1918, when Transylvania become part of Romania. Not only the Hungarian 
university was transferred to Szeged, as mentioned before, with all students and 
teachers, across the newly drawn border between Romania and Hungary, but its 
patrimony remained at the disposal of the newly created Romanian university in 
town. On the one hand, a Hungarian speaking university in the heart of 
Transylvania would have been a symbolic challenge to the Romanian primacy 
in the new framework of the Romanian national state. On the other hand, the 
patrimony and all the facilities of the former Hungarian university were an 
important asset for a new Romanian university, working for the advancement of 
Romanian culture and science. As emphasized by Livezeanu,38 the unification 
of Transylvania with Romania brought in important ethnic minorities, disposing 
of more active, educated and urbanized elites and making the task of unifying 
the political territory and national culture difficult for the Romanian elites. 
As a counter-response, the fascist Hungarian government transferred 
the Romanian university in Cluj in 1940 across the redrawn state border to 
Sibiu, when half of Transylvania was ceased to Hungary according to the 
second Vienna Award. The officially stated friendship between neighboring 
Hungarian and Romanian states and between Hungarian and Romanian workers 
and peasants during the first years of the communist regime was consolidated 
by the restauration of the Hungarian speaking university in Cluj, this time 
bearing the name of the illustrious Hungarian-Transylvanian mathematician 
János Bolyai. It functioned in the city alongside the university teaching in 
Romanian, which turned back from from its exile in 1945, with the defeat of 
fascist Hungary in World War Two, and bearing the name of the well-known 
Romanian biologist Victor Babeș. The Hungarian anti-communist uprising of 
1956 and the increasingly nationalistic features of the Romanian communist 
regime led to the merger of the two formerly independent higher education 
institutions into a single institution, called ‘Babeș-Bolyai’. 
The accommodation of the two Romanian and Hungarian speaking 
communities was not easy, since Hungarian speaking teachers and students 
were not allowed to organize into autonomous Hungarian teaching faculties, but 
only to be part of multi-lingual (Romanian, Hungarian and German) faculties. 
The Hungarian teaching tracks have therefore always been supplied by 
Hungarian teachers organized in chairs, but engulfed into larger faculties, with 
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no real decision power. The empowerment of the Hungarian speaking teachers 
into the university decision bodies was one of the requests of the Hungarian 
community of teachers and students after 1989, when they expected that 
communist breakdown would bring in the much-awaited separation of mixed 
faculties. With the ongoing demographic domination of the Romanian speaking 
teachers in mixed faculties, this is impossible. On the other hand, the ruling 
body of the university strongly denounced external political pressures made by 
the Romanian parties in the government in order to please their coalition 
partner, the Hungarian Party UDMR.39 The University Senate, dominated by 
Romanian speaker professors, rejected the proposal to separate mixed faculties 
by regrouping existing Romanian, Hungarian and German tracks out of mixed 
faculties in order to form mono-lingual ones. According to the University 
Senate, this move would seriously affect the multi-cultural aspect and 
functioning of the university, as well as its scientific competitiveness. 
Moreover, separating mixed faculties would encourage further separation of 
newly formed mono-lingual faculties and, eventually, the regrouping of those 
new mono-lingual faculties into a separate university, as it was the case in the 
early 1950s with the former ‘János Bolyai’ University. Despite the discontent 
expressed by Hungarian teachers and even the protest of some Hungarian 
speaking students, the university senate rejected the proposal for reshaping the 
university structure and kept the long-lasting status-quo in place. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 The minority language status in Romania changed dramatically during 
the last three decades. Just before 1989 and in the early 1990s, Romanian was 
the dominant and almost exclusive language, with little concession done to 
minority languages. Despite its proclaimed internationalism during the 1950s, 
Romanian communism turned into a nationalistic regime in the late 1980s.40 
Through this move, national-communism rejoined Romanian nationalistic 
policies of the 1930s, aimed at consolidating the national state and at culturally 
unify the territory. At that moment, Romania was a young national state, build by 
binding together provinces that were previously part of multi-national empires. 
 The change in minority language status in Romania was due to 
changing contexts, both internally and externally. On the one hand, on internal 
grounds, the new Romanian constitution, which stated the national character of 
the state and the primacy of the Romanian language, was not seriously 
contested or attacked by ethnic minority parties, especially by the Hungarian 
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party. Unlike other ethnic groups who engaged in overt and bloody conflicts, as 
it was the case in former Yugoslavia, ethnic Hungarians made proof of their 
loyalty and willingness to contribute to the re-building of a democratic and 
prosperous Romania following decades of communist rule. Their integration 
into the political system and the coalition partnership between Romanian parties 
and the Hungarian party have largely helped Romania to access both NATO, 
the European Union and the Council of Europe. 
 On the other hand, integration into regional organizations also meant 
improving minority rights, and especially linguistic rights. External 
conditionality added to favorable internal factors, particularly the willingness 
for cooperation expressed by both the Romanian majority and the Hungarian 
ethnic minority. This combination of factors proved to be essential in improving 
minority rights without invalidating the essential features of the Romanian 
national state. Those factors made the difference between the nationalistic 
period, until 1996, and the cooperation period that followed. Although 
Romanian remains the official language, keeping its primacy deriving from the 
Constitution, the use of minority languages has been accepted as a reasonable 
compromise. Granting unrestricted rights to ethnic minorities has transferred 
into a persistent peaceful ethnic environment, in deep contrast with the 
Yugoslav or the Baltic contexts. By combining favorable external and internal 
factors, Romania moved from laggard to leader in the matter of minority rights. 
In is worth mentioning, for example, that external pressure made many EU 
candidate countries in Central and Eastern Europe to adopt higher standard for 
minority rights than former EU members. Whereas Romania ratified the 
European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in 2008, states like 
France and Italy signed the document without ratifying it, while other EU 
member states, like Greece, Belgium or Portugal, even refused to sign it.41 
 The expansion of minority rights adds new facilities for ethnic 
minorities. Not only ethnic minorities can symbolically affirm their presence by 
displaying their symbols, like flags, on public buildings in areas where they live 
in important shares, but they now benefit of extended linguistic rights. 
Beginning with 2017, the previous linguistic rights in public administration and 
education have been extended to healthcare. Ethnic Hungarians, Gypsies and 
Turks, those minorities which are territorially concentrated as to form important 
minority shares in cities, can use their language in hospitals and ask to be in 
contact with medical staff speaking their language. 
Of course, despite the essential improvement of minority rights, 
important issues are still at stake in various areas, like higher education and 
public administration. This is the case of a public university teaching in 
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Hungarian in Cluj, founded as a brand new institution or by forming and 
segregating Hungarian speaking faculties from the existing Babeș-Bolyai 
university. Hungarian is also used in Transylvania, as a second official 
language, thus expanding the use of Hungarian in all public domains, and by 
turning Hungarian from a minority language to an equal language. This already 
happened in Belgium with the use of Flemish in Brussels and in Flanders. 
Whatever the issue might be, the mechanism of negotiating and solving 
potential ethnic conflicts now makes the difference between the former 
institutional arrangement in Romania, which emphasized Romanian as the 
nation’s language, and the current institutional framework and practice that is 
based on reasonable compromise, ethnic tolerance and cooperation. 
 
